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Foreword


This report-An Analysis of the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle with Emphasis 
on High-Level Waste Management-summarizes the results of a research project 
conducted by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP). 
The broad purpose of the project is to provide analytical support to OSTP in connec­
tion with the Federal Coordination Council of Science Engineering and Technology in the 
area of high-level nuclear waste management. The specific objectives of this project are 
to: 
(1) 	 Examine the most active nuclear waste disposal programs and plans to determine 
strengths and inconsistencies. 
(2) 	 Assess implications of schedules for waste disposal. 
(3) 	 Identify necessary but missing elements in waste disposal plans. 
This study has-been performed by a group drawn from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the 
campus of the California Institute of Technology, and the Scripps Institution of Ocean­
ography. The leader of the team is Thomas English; others principally concerned with the 
analysis and writing the report include Edward Bullard, Lester Lees, Robert Campbell, 
Alan Chockie, Calvin Davis, Edward Divita, Edward Edelson, Thomas Kuehn, Joseph 
Klimberg, Charles Miller and Michael Ziman. The duration of the study was approxi­
mately 7 months, and involved 2 man-years of effort. 
The work was funded under a National Science Foundation Interagency Agreement 
No. NSF-CA76-8446. The contract Technical Directors were Dr. Russell Drew, Assistant 
Director, OSTP and Dr. Joel Snow, Senior Policy Analyst, OSTP. 
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Abstract


The programs and plans of the U.S. Government for the "back end of the nuclear 
fuel cycle" were examined to determine if there were any significant technological or 
regulatory gaps and inconsistencies. Particular emphasis was.placed -on analysis of-high­
level nuclear waste management plans, since the permanent disposal of radioactive waste 
has emerged as a major factor in the public acceptance of nuclear power. The implications 
of various light water reactor fuel cycle options were examined including: throwaway, 
stowaway, uranium recycle, and plutonium plus uranium recycle. 
The results of this study indicate that the U.S. program for high~level waste manage­
ment has significant gaps and inconsistencies. Areas of greatest concern include: the 
adequacy of the scientific data: base for- geological disposal; programs for the disposal of 
spent fuel rods; interagency coordination; and uncertainties in NRC regulatory require­
ments for disposal of both commercial and military high-level waste. 
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It is self-evident that, during the growthprocess, the same challenge is never presented 
more than once. For, ex hypothesi, so long as growth is being maintained, each 
successive challenge is being successfully met, or, in other words disposed of as a living 
issue and relegatedto the history books. By contrastwe can see that, in a series in which 
the outcome of each successive challenge is not victory but defeat, the unanswered 
challenge can never be disposed of and is therefore bound to present itself again and 
again until it receives sonie overdue and inperfect answer, or else brings about the 
destruction of a society which has shown itself inveterately incapableof responding to it 
effectively. 
Arnold Toynbee 
A Study of History 
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POORSummary 
The disposal of radioactive materials produced by nuclear reactors has emerged as a 
major factor in the public acceptance of nuclear power. The problems of waste disposal 
cannot be considered in isolation. They are intimately connected with the nature-of the 
fuel cycle as a whole, and in particular with the decision as to whether spent fuel rods are 
to be reprocessed, stowed-away for possible future reprocessing, or thrown-away 
irretrievably. 
Section I of this report describes the nature of the nuclear spent fuel recycle and waste 
disposal issues, in addition to the implications of various light water reactor fuel cycle 
options. Section II describes the complex inter-relationship of Federal, State and private 
sector decisions on the viability of commercial reprocessing. The economic and resource 
implications of various decision paths are also discussed. In Section III, the programs of 
the Federal Government for disposal of high-level waste from commercial reactors are 
examined in order to determine regulatory and technological gaps and inconsistencies. 
Section IV discusses the influence of Federal, State and municipal regulatory action on 
waste management. In addition, the results of an examination of the regulatory require­
ments for military and commercial high level waste management are presented. Section V 
brings together our conclusions. The principal function of the appendixes, contained in 
Volume II, is to describe the present reprocessing and waste management programs of 
EPA, ERDA and NRC. 
To summarize our findings, it appears to us that the following matters are important: 
(1) Spent Fuel Rods 
The accumulation of spent fuel rods at reactor sites should be limited, since a 
continuation of present practices into the indefinite future would constitute a de 
facto form of nuclear waste disposal. Analysis should be carried out and plans 
should be formulated for the development of both centralized spent fuel pools, 
and centralized passive spent fuel storage facilities in order to make the "stow­
away option" a viable alternative. In addition, methods and schedules for the 
ultimate disposal of spent fuel rods need to be developed in order to make the 
"throwaway option" a real alternative. 
(2) FederalProgram 
The resources devoted to high-level waste management by NRC and EPA have 
been inadequate in view of the cntical roles these agencies play in developing 
standards, criteria and regulations. The budgets of these two agencies have 
recently been increased substantially. However, we question whether the 
resources available to these two agencies are-commensurate with their responsi­
bilities. There appears to be a lack of an adequate platform for systematic discus­
sion of the sufficiency of the scientific data base for geologic disposal. An impor­
tant outcome of such discussion would be the development of decisions as to 
what parameters should be monitored, and for how long, during the test phase of 
a specific repository site. In addition, there appears to be a need for improved 
coordination of the nation's high-level nuclear waste program. One method of 
providing better coordination would involve formation of a high level inter­
agency committee for nuclear waste management. This committee could provide 
a mechanism for resolving issues, and could fulfill the function of coordinating 
the activities of the Federal agencies concerned with nuclear waste processing, 
packaging, transport, and disposal. Another approach might be to appoint a 
x 
single individual from, for example, the Executive Office of the President, to 
serve as a focal point for the nation's high-level nuclear waste management 
program. 
In light of President Carter's decision to defer reprocessing indefinitely, the 
schedule for operation of a repository for commercial high-level waste by 1985 
should be re-examined and revised. In addition, the timing of the promulgation 
of NRC siting criteria for high-level waste disposal sites, and the site selection 
activities of ERDA should be revised to make them compatible. 
(3) Regulations 
NRC is mandated to license both commercial and military high-level waste 
repositories. NRC-has not decided whether to require either site selection review 
and/or construction licenses for these repositories. We believe that assumption of 
these responsibilities by NRC could hasten the ultimate development of these 
repositories. In the area of pilot plant retrievable repositories for high-level 
waste, NRC plans to license commercial but not military pilot plants. Extending 
NRC's licensing authority to include military pilot plant repositories would 
eliminate this inconsistency. 
(4) Alternative Fuel Cycles 
Alternative fuel cycles should be systematically studied from the standpoint of 
reducing the problems associated with waste disposal, proliferation and 
safeguards. 
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Section I 
Introduction 
A critical issue for the future development of commercial nuclear power in the U.S. 
is the disposition of the spent fuel from light-water nuclear reactors. This spent fuel 
contains highly radioactive fission products, isotopes of plutonium, uranium, and other 
actinides. Although the fission products in the spent fuel will have decayed to insignificant 
amounts after about 1,000 years, the plutonium and other actinides remain a radiological 
hazard for periods of 100,000 to I million years (Ref. 1). At present, spent fuel is 
accumulating at the rate of 1,400 metric tons per year. The radioactivity accompanying 
this annual discharge is about 6 x l01 Curies (Ci) after 160 days of cooling. Since no 
reprocessing plants for commercial nuclear power plant spent fuel are operating in the 
U.S., spent fuel rods are being stored in spent fuel pools which are primarily located at 
reactor sites. Even by the most conservative estimates of the growth in nuclear electrical 
generating capacity, the yearly discharge of spent fuel will have doubled by 1983, and the 
cumulative "backlog" will be about 13,000 tons. Allowing for decay, the radioactivity of 
this material, about 1010 Ci, will be approximately equal to that of all the-military high­
level nuclear waste ("ERDA waste") now in storage (about 400,000 tons) (Ref. 2). 
A. Study Environment 
Decisions concerning the disposition of spent fuel rods must be made within the 
framework set by Presidential policy statements. On October 28, 1976, former President 
Gerald Ford concluded that "the U.S. will not proceed with reprocessing and recycling of 
plutonium unless there is sound reason to determine that the world community can effec­
tively overcome the associated risks of proliferation." In his energy message of April 7, 
1977, President Carter announced his decisions to indefinitely defer reprocessing of spent 
fuel and recycling of plutonium, and to defer the development of the plutonium fast 
breeder reactor (LMFBR). With these statements in mind, the purposes of this report are 
to examine: (1) the range of policy options now open for the disposition of spent fuel rods, 
including advantages and disadvantages of each option; (2) the impact of each of these 
policy options on the Federal high-level waste management program; (3) the management 
of already existing military waste; (4) high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel rod 
management, with particular emphasis on interagency coordination, Federal, State and 
private sector decisions, program consistency, logic of time sequences, and gaps in 
present programs. 
B. Principal Options 
The principal spent fuel management options are throwaway, stowaway and recycle 
of fissile materials. These options are discussed in the following sections. 
1. Throwaway Option 
Since the "throwaway option" is now a distinct possibility, the spent fuel rods them­
selves may become the radioactive waste product, and present nuclear waste management 
plans would-have to be revised to provide for safe terminal disposal of these fuel rods. A 
"throwaway" decision would mean that the "lifetime" of the LWR as an energy source 
would be about 10,000 GW(e)-years, corresponding to an average capacity of 200,000 
MW(e) for 50 years, with a peak capacity of about 280,000 MW(e) in the year 2000. 
These estimates are based on a conservative prediction of U.S. reserves at 2 x 106 tons of 
U30. A "throwaway" decision would also mean that the option of developing the 
plutonium fast breeder reactor would be deferred indefinitely. However, if the throwaway 
1


option is chosen, it might still be possible to extract sufficient 23 5U from U.S. uranium 
ores to start up the non-breeder thorium light water reactor on a commercial scale in 
10- 15 years (Ref. 3). By recycling 233U, it would then be possible to convert the conven­
tional LWR into a 232Th- 233 U breeder reactor (Ref. 4). On the positive side, the 
throwaway option means that the plutonium in the spent fuel is never separated from the 
fission products, thus avoiding the problems- of safeguards-and proliferation associated 
3
with reprocessing and recycling. Radioactive gases such as 85Kr, II and 14C, which 
would be released to the environment, are contained within the spent fuel rods. Further­
more, shipments of radioactive materials are minimized. 
2. Stowaway Options 
In view of present uncertainties, it seems desirable to leave open as many decision 
paths as possible. One such option, providing considerable flexibility, is the "stowaway" 
option. This involves retrievable storage and safe containment of the spent fuel rods in 
adequately guarded surface or sub-surface facilities, for a period of about 20 years * 
During this period, additional R&D (including demonstration) on permanent high-level 
waste disposal could be vigorously pursued in an orderly manner. Recycle options, such 
as "co-processing" of uranium and plutonium and the thorium light-water breeder reactor, 
could be thoroughly investigated. In fact, "stowaway" has many important positive 
features even if it is eventually decided to reprocess spent fuel. For example, after 20 
years of spent fuel storage, both 131 1 and 242Cm (the transuranic nuclide with the highest 
specific radioactivity) would have virtually disappeared from the spent fuel. The rate of 
thermal energy output from the spent fuel would be reduced by a factor of about 20, 
compared to its value one year after discharge. On the negative side, the stowaway option 
involves the costs of maintaining and safeguarding retrievable storage facilities, signifi­
cantly increased land use (if surface storage is selected), the possibility of cladding corro­
sion, and potentially increased exposure to radioactivity. 
3. Recycling Options 
The reason for keeping the reprocessing and recycling option open via "stowaway' is 
that the spent fuel from commercial light-water reactors (LWR) contains significant 
quantities of recoverable plutonium and 235U fuel. By separating 99.5% of the U and Pu 
from the fission products, and recycling this reclaimed fuel in LWR's, the amount of fresh 
uranium U308 required to generate a given amount of electrical energy can be reduced by
30% to 40% (Ref. 5). Recycling 99.5% of the uranium reduces the mass of spent fuel 
materials in the high-level waste stream by a factor of 25 compared to the original mass of 
the spent fuel. However, since the current concept of high-level waste disposal includes 
placement of the cladding hulls in the same repository as the high-level waste, the net 
effect of recycling is to reduce the mass by only a factor of 4. 
During the first decade after discharge from a commercial nuclear reactor, there is no 
significant difference between the recycling and throwaway options in the total radio­
activity of the materials to be deposited in the high-level waste repository. However, after 
about 1,000 years, the radioactivity of reprocessed waste is reduced by a factor of about 
10 compared with what would remain from a throwaway LWR fuel cycle. The amounts 
and total radioactivity of the actinides in the repository are dependent on the amount of 
plutonium recycled back to the reactor. This point is discussed in more detail in 
Appendix G. 
*This option should be carefully distinguished from the opaon proposed a few years ago for a recoverable 
surface storage facility (RSSF) for high-level nuclear waste after reprocessing. 
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Many other recycling options are available, all of which affect the character of the 
final "waste." For example, plutonium could be separated from the reprocessing of spent 
fuel and kept in storage for later utilization. The plutonium could be used in burner and 
breeder LWR's, or for start-up of a fast breeder reactor if a decision is made later to 
develop the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR)., Use of the FBR makes available about 50 times 
as much uranium for electrical energy generation as the open-cycle LWR. However, this 
potential benefit is not without risks, since these policy options raise important questions 
about safeguards against terrorist activity and theft of plutonium. They also account for 
the current interest in developing international agreements and controls on reprocessing 
spent fuel to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Because of the magnitude and complexity of the problem of nuclear waste manage­
ment, the Office of Science and Technology Policy requested that we concentrate our 
efforts on the most pressing issues affecting the current Federal high-level waste manage­
ment programs for LWR's with throwaway, stowaway and reprocessing-recycling 
options. Particular emphasis has been placed on identifying the problems of interagency 
coordination; Federal, State and private sector decisions required; program consistency, 
logic of time sequences, and gaps in present programs. An analysis of the implications of 
alternative fuel cycles is recommended for a later study. 
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Section II 
Commercial Fuel Reprocessing 
A. General Considerations 
The future of reprocessing of spent fuel from commercial LWR's, in the United 
States, will be determined as much by foreign policy considerations, institutional 
decisions, and capital investment decisions, as by technological and energy resource 
considerations. Figure 2-1 illustrates both the major decision paths that could be examined 
in considering nuclear fuel recycle options, and also the implications of each path for the 
management of spent fuel rods and high-level nuclear waste. Current U.S. policy, as 
defined by President Carter on April 7, 1977, is indicated by both the thick pathways and 
the heavily outlined boxes on the left-hand side of Figure 2-1. This policy indefinitely 
defers reprocessing of spent fuel rods from commercial nuclear electrical power reactors. 
If, at some future date, satisfactory international controls against proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and satisfactory safeguards against potential terrorist activities are developed, 
the President might decide to proceed with reprocessing and recycling. The decision 
paths that would be opened up by this major policy change are indicated in the shaded half of 
Figure 2-1 on the right side ofthe figure. These paths are examined in the following sections. 
1. Federal Decisions 
For example, if the President decides to permit recycling of uranium without 
recycling plutonium, the decision path begins with the arrow labeled "yes" emerging 
from the decision box labeled "President Carter's U Recycling Decision" (center-left). 
First, the industry would determine if the economics of uranium recycle appeared to be 
acceptable. If the economics were favorable, and if an NRC license for private recovery of 
uranium were successfully obtained, then Federal decisions concerning Pu storage would 
have to be made. The plutonium could be stored in either an ERDA facility, or a private 
facility for possible later use in either potential fast breeder reactors or light water 
reactors. If neither of these options are chosen, the plutonium could be discarded with the 
high-level waste. These decisions could significantly impact the economics of the initial 
analysis of uranium recycling by the industry. If a re-analysis of the economics indicates 
that uranium recycle alone is not profitable, several options are available. The utilities 
could store the spent fuel rods as a potential source of future fuel. If the utilities choose not 
to do this, the government could choose this option. Both of these storage options are a 
form of stowaway. If decisions are made against both of these storage options, then the 
spent fuel rods themselves must be packaged and ultimately disposed of in a repository. 
Even if, at some future time, reprocessing should become politically acceptable, 
Federal court decisions, and NRC hearings and regulations on the use of mixed-oxide 
(MOX) fuels, could contribute to a final decision on reprocessing. The outcome of the 
NRC hearings on the Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed-Oxide Fuels (GESMO, 
shown in Figure 2-1) concerning the health, safety and environmental aspects of pluto­
nium recycling could be of importance in the decision-making process. In addition, NRC 
is scheduled to issue a safeguards supplement to GESMO in the near future, and may wish 
to revise the proposed rules relating to MOX fuels in the LWR cycle that are published in 
41 Fed. Reg. 40506-10, December 20, 1976. 
Figure 2-1 indicates that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plays an 
important role in influencing nuclear spent fuel options. Recently, the EPA promulgated 
fuel cycle environmental standards (Ref. 6) that apply to ". . . most operations within the 
fuel cycle, including the operations of milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, 
4
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light-water cooled reactors, and fuel reprocessing, but exclude mining, the transportation 
of radioactive materials in connection with any of these operations, and waste manage­
ment operation." These standards are summarized as follows: 
(1) A nearest resident shall not be exposed to more than 25 mrcm/ycar 
(2) Emissions of certain long-lived effluents shall be limited to: 
* Kr-85 50,000 curies/GW(e)-year 
* 1-129 5 millicuries/GW(e)-year 
* Actinides 0.5 millicuries/GW(e)-year 
No significant technological difficulties are expected to arise in meeting these new EPA 
requirements; for example, the technology for cryogenic removal of Kr-85 has already 
been "cold-tested." 
2. 	 State and Private Sector Decisions 
The impact of possible actions by individual states on reprocessing decisions is well 
illustrated by the hearings conducted in the Spring of 1977 by the California State Energy, 
Resources, Conservation and Development Commission (ERCDC) in connection with 
Assembly Bill #2820 (Ref. 7). This bill, passed by the State legislature in 1976, provides 
that no new nuclearpower plantswhich require reprocessing will be granted land use by 
the State of California unless both the existence of a reprocessing technology, and its 
approval by the Federal Government are established. These ERCDC hearings have 
brought out the following important information concerning the status of commercial 
reprocessing: 
(1) 	 Facilities for the separation of U and Pu from spent fuel rods from commercial 
LWR's, and for the subsequent conversion of the uranyl nitrate to uranium hexa­
fluoride have been built in Barnwell, S.C. These facilities have not been operated. 
Both plutonium oxide conversion and high-level waste solidification facilities 
have not yet been built for commercial spent fuel. 
(2) 	 Lessons learned from the now-defunct fuel reprocessing plants of General 
Electric at Morris, Illinois, and Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) at West Valley, 
New York, led to significant design changes in the Allied General Nuclear 
Services' (AGNS) FRP complex at Barnwell, South Carolina (Refs. 8 and 9). 
AGNS management expects that these changes will overcome difficulties experi­
enced in early U.S. FRP's. 
(3) 	 The position taken by AGNS is that the Barnwell plant should be converted to a 
demonstration FRP, even though $250 million has already been invested in the 
separations and UF 6 facility. AGNS proposes (Ref. 10) that ERDA first buy the 
present facility from AGNS, and then proceed to build facilities for conversion of 
plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, and also for solidification of high-level 
waste. Under this proposal the entire complex would be federally owned but 
privately operated by AGNS. In addition, AGNS proposes to reserve the right to 
"buy-back" the entire facility at some future date. 
The above summary indicates that there is considerable uncertainty, and hence, 
economic risk in commercial reprocessing. Until these interrelated Federal, State and 
private sector questions are resolved, commercial reprocessing in the U.S. may continue 
to be deferred indefinitely. 
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B. Economics and Resources 
Estimates of the net economic benefits (or cost) of reprocessing spent fuel from 
LWR's are sensitive to both the predicted price behavior of Pu and U30., and: to the 
predicted costs, of storage, transportation, repocessing-and waste disposal. Whether there 
is a net economic gain or loss is of vital importance to the future of the commercial 
-reprocessing -industry. 'HoWever, the iinpact of the nefbenefit (or cost) of reprocessing on 
the-entire LWR nuclear fuel cycle is small. For example, the maximum net estimated 
benefit is on the order to 1mill/kWh(e) in 1976 dollars, or about 6% in comparison with 
the estimated cost of generating electricity 6f about 15 mills/kWh(3) (Ref. 11). In addi­
tion, it should be noted that a capital investment of about I billion -dollars in an FRP 
complex represents about 2% of the capital investment in the 50 LWR's serviced by this 
FRP. 
Estimates of the savings in uranium (U30.) resource requirements depend'on: (1)the 
degree of enrichment of the fuel supplied to the LWR; (2) the 235U content of the depleted 
uranium discharged from the isotope separationplant after the enrichment process, and 
(3) the blend-of natural uranium and recycled plutonium (PuO2 ) supplied to the LWR in 
the "'equilibriumstate" which is reached after 4 or 5 cycles. For example, if one-third of 
the reactor fuel is ,natural uranium blended with recycled plutonium, and the other two­
thirds consists of uranium-(UO2 ) enrichedto 3.3%, thefresh U308 requirement is about 
110 tonnes per-year for a 1,000,MW(e) reactor operatingzat 80% of capacity (Ref. 12). 
This figure of 110 tonnes/yr should be compared with,the requirement of about 1-80 
tonnes/year of U30, for an,open-cycle LWR -generating the sameamount of electrical 
energy. Hence, a reduction of about-40% in uranium mining requirements over the life­
time of each reactor could be achieved.through recycling. 
If plutonium FBR's were to be developed, a certain number of LWR's would be 
required to devote their plutonium output to supplying the start-up loadings of the first­
generation breeders. Approximately 18 GW(e)-years inventory of spent 'fuel from 
U-fueled LWR'swould-be required to supply the 3,100 Kg of Pu needed to start-up each 
GW(e)-FBR (Ref. 13). Thus, if the. throwaway optionfor spent fuel-rods wefe. adopted, 
there would be no viable future option of utilizing Pu-based FBR's-by the U.S. 
The current methods of storing spent -fuel rods from commercial 'power reactors 
consist of either storage at the spent fuel pool at the reactor site, or shipment to a 
centralized spent fuel pool at Morris, Illinois. In either case, this form of stowaway option 
has economic'costs, associated with it that are borne by the utilities. Ultimately, these costs 
must-be reflected in the price of electricity. 
If the assumption is made that the nominal storage costs at the Morris, Illinois spent 
fuel pool are reflective of reactor spent fuel-pool storage costs, then arebtal fee of $10,000 
per metric ton of spent fuel per year can bemusedt Since a gigawatt electrical reactor pro­
duces approximately 33 metric tons of spent fuel per-year, the cost of storing-spent fuel 
from the reactor would-be $330,000 for the first year of storage. If delays in the waste 
disposal program cause, for example, a single year's output of spent-fuel to remain in a 
spent fuel pool for ten years, then the cumulative storage cost for that quantity would be 
$3,300,000. If'we considerthat additional fuel is added to the spent.fuel pool each year,
the annual storage cost increases from $330,000 forthe-first year to $3,300,000 for the 
tenth year. The corresponding cumulative storage cost increases from $330,000 for the 
first year to $18,150,000 for ihe tenth-year. If thesestorage costs are translated to mills per 
kilowatt hours, the cumulative cost for the-first year is approximately .04mills/kWh. For 
the tenth year, this cumulative:cost increases significantly to 0.22 mills/kWh. The annual 
storage cost for the tenth year is 0.40 mills/kWh. 
In order to avoid the possibility of having to shut down the reactors because of 
insufficient spent fuel storage capacity, some utilities are increasing their storage capacity 
through re-racking and expansion of their spent fuel pools at the reactor site (Ref. 14). The 
possibility of moving the spent fuel to storage sites away from the reactor is also being 
considered. It may appear in the economic interest of the utilities to store the spent fuel 
rods for a long period of time. A report by Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS) 
(Reference 1) estimates the net worth of spent fuel rods from commercial power reactors 
to be approximately $260 per kilogram. This net worth includes the value of the recovered 
products minus the costs of waste handling, reprocessing, spent fuel transportation, and 
spent fuel storage for a single year. Assuming this value to be correct and ignoring effects 
of inflation, price fluctuations of uranium, etc., the break-even point for storage would 
occur at approximately 26 years. However, if the assumptions used in the AGNS analysis 
prove to be overly optimistic, the spent fuel could constitute a liability instead of an asset. 
This would be the case if present reprocessing policies were to continue indefinitely. An 
interesting situation could occur if a utility were to examine the current set of uncertainties 
regarding reprocessing, and decide to declare its spent fuel as high-level waste- If this 
occurred, would the government then be responsible for the annual cost associated with 
the storage of the spent fuel rods? Could the government disagree with the utility's 
position that the spent fuel rods were high-level waste? At present, the government's posi­
tion on these matters is not at all clear. In any case, the present spent fuel rod situation 
constitutes an interesting uncertainty in the establishment of utility rates since spent fuel can 
be viewed as either an asset or a liability depending on the set of assumptions. As our 
previous analysis indicated, the present cost increment associated with spent fuel storage is 
a relatively small percentage of the overall cost of electrical power production. However, 
if the present practice of storing the spent fuel rods continues indefinitely, the cost to 
electrical utilities could become a significant fraction of its overall production costs. 
Regardless of the future decision on reprocessing, disposal of spent fuel rods and/or 
reprocessed nuclear waste remains a major problem. The current national program for dis­
posal of high-level nuclear waste is discussed in the following section. 
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Commercial High-Level Waste Disposal 
Since radioactive high-level wastes contain some of-the most toxic materials known 
(Refs. 16-18), they must be isolated from the environment for many centuries. The time 
periodthat the waste must be isolated may be debatable, but ranges from approximately a 
thousand years to a million years (Refs. 19, 20). Since these isolation times are larger than 
the lifetimes of most social and political institutions, an ultimate waste disposal solution 
which would require institutional stability for these long periods of time lacks a certain 
degree of credibility (Refs. 21, 22). 
Decision-making on the time scale of 30 generations to 30,000 generations is new to


mankind. Unfortunately, there is no way to avoidmaking decisions, since large quantities


of high-level nuclear waste from both the military weapons program and the commercial
 

nuclear power program are extant and growing (Refs. 23, 24). The potential inter­

generational, somatic and genetic effects are extremely difficult to calculate (Ref. 25), and


therefore large "ignorance factors" are inherent. There are basic toxicological uncertain­

ties in the radio-nuclide health effects data base. For example, Karl Morgan (Ref. 26) has


estimated that the current plutonium standard for maximum permissible body burden


needs to be decreased by at least two orders of magnitude (Ref. 27).


One method that appears to have promise for successfully disposing of high-level 
nuclear waste is deep-geologic disposal. The current U.S. program gives prime emphasis 
to deep geologic disposal in bedded salt. This choice is based in part on the results of 
previous experimental activities involving the testing of concepts for disposal of high­
level waste in bedded salt deposits in Lyons, Kansas (Refs. 28-31). Major questions of 
the predictability of geologic stability over these time scales exist (Ref. 32). There are 
large uncertainties concerning the rate and method of migration of radionuclides through 
both the geosphere and the biosphere (Refs. 33-35). Criteria for judgments, in the face of 
these uncertainties, are in need of considerable refinement (Ref. 36). Since there are 
currently strong disputes in the scientific community over both goals and criteria for 
acceptable disposal of high-level nuclear waste, it may be very difficult for EPA and NRC 
to establish broadly acceptable environmental standards and design criteria for high-level 
radioactive waste repositories. It is not possible to make definitive statements concerning 
technological capabilities for successfully disposing of high-level waste, if the basic goals 
and criteria have not been established. 
One of the difficulties that contributes to disputes involving requirements for the 
disposal of both spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste is the apparent lack of an adequate 
platform for discussion of the sufficiency of the scientific data base for geologic disposal. 
Such a platform might, for example, concentrate on a systematic analysis of the various 
events that could lead to biologically significant quantities of high-level waste encounter­
ing the biosphere. A fault tree analysis approach could be used to describe the various 
possible events and pathways which might cause biologically significant quantities of the 
high-level waste to be transported from the geologic isolation site to the biosphere. The 
components of these event trees could be presented and debated both at public meetings 
and in scientific journals. This could lead to the development of a systematic framework 
for determination and accumulation of the required data for a successful containment of 
the high-level waste. The scientific community could identify technical components of 
each event and pathway element which have significant scientific uncertainty. Research 
programs could be formulated to reduce these uncertainties to levels which are considered 
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acceptable. Over a period of time, an approach of this kind could lead to an increased 
scientific consensus regarding the detailed site specific requirements for successful, long­
term containment of high-level waste. 
Some elements of this approach are presently in existence. Various groups of the 
National Academy of Sciences (Refs. 37-39), have published their views concerning 
disposal of high-level waste. New studies by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories (Ref. 
30), Battelle Pacific Northwest, (Ref. 41), and the American Physical Society (Ref. 42) 
are steps in this direction. If these starts are capitalized on to provide a better platform for 
scientific debate, it is expected that increased closure could be obtained within the 
scientific community concerning the detailed requirements of acceptable approaches for 
the long-term containment of high-level nuclear waste. 
At present, the U.S. has no repositories for the ultimate containment of high-level 
waste from-either the military programs or the commercial power programs. Plans have 
been formulated by the federal government, culminating in operation of a national 
repository for hitah-level nuclear waste in a retrievable mode by 1985 (Ref. 43). In order to 
meet this objective, a series of milestones must be met for both technological and 
regulatory programs. The major features of these program plans are described in the 
following sections. 
A. Agency Activities in High-Level Waste Disposal 
The principal Federal interactions between EPA, ERDA, and NRC required to 
develop an operating repository for commercial'high-level nuclear waste are represented 
in Figure 3-1. In this diagram, involving 23 principal activities, EPA is involved in only 
one, i.e., the establishment of environmental standards for high-level radioactive waste 
disposition. However, the importance of this activity should not be underestimated, since 
the scientific defensibility of these environmental standards must be quite high in order to 
lead to public acceptability. 
Figure 3-1 is divided into two main components of flow. The upper section indicates 
activities leading to the development of a repository-for high-level waste. The lower sec­
tion indicates the activities leading to solidification and packaging of high-level waste. If 
the spent fuel is declared to be waste then "packaging" refers to the packaging of spent 
fuel assemblies. High-level solidification, packaging and repository activities are dis­
cussed in the following section. 
1. HLW Repository Activities 
NRC has not decided (Ref. 44) whether to license commercial high-level waste 
repositories under the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, (Ref. 45) 10 CFR part 30 
(by-product), 10 CFR part 40 (source material), 10 CFR part 50 (reactor and FRP's) or 10 
CFR part 70 (special nuclear materials). NRC could also choose to develop a completely 
new licensing procedure for high-level nuclear waste repositories. There are compelling 
arguments for giving NRC maximum regulatory control. Recent experience has shown 
that anything less than strict regulatory control by the Federal government over HLW 
activities leads to court challenges by intervenors that cause costly delays in the national 
program of NWM (Ref. 46). The spirit as well as the language of the energy reorganiza­
tion act also leads to the conclusion that strict regulatory control is necessary. Under 
licensing procedures such as 10 CFR part 50, ERDA would be required to obtain both an 
NRC construction permit and an NRC operating license. Furthermore, in the case of HLW 
repositories, it appears desirable to require an NRC site review, in orderto obtain a second 
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independent assessment of the proposed site early in the developmental cycle. In the case 
of nuclear reactors, there is a precedent for site review, since an optional early site review 
by NRC can be requested by an electrical utility. 
Since public acceptance is such a vital consideration, we believe that maximum 
regulatory control by NRC is essential. Therefore, we have drawn Figure 3-1 to corre­
spond with frequent formal interaction between ERDA and NRC. The figure shows that 
based on EPA's environmental standard for high-level waste disposal, ERDA's generic 
environmental impact statement on waste management, and other information, NRC 
develops site selection criteria for repositories. ERDA selects sites and NRC approves 
sites based on these criteria. NRC develops final design and operating criteria for the 
HLW repositories before ERDA designs the repository. In addition, this design is submit­
, ted to NRC for a construction license. NRC must prepare a final EIS for the retrievable 
repository before granting ERDA a construction license. Upon approval, ERDA can start 
construction of a retrievable repository for commercial high-level waste. After construc­
tion, NRC could issue, an operating license to ERDA to perform tests using retnevable 
high-level waste canisters. Subsequent to a set of repository tests which as yet have not 
been completely defined, NRC prepares an environmental impact statement on approval 
of permanent disposal of high-level waste. After this EIS is accepted, NRC can approve 
the permanent disposal of high-level waste at the operating site. ERDA is then in a posi­
tion to accept solidified high-level waste for irretrievable disposal. 
2. High-Level Waste Solidification and Packaging Activities 
High-level waste solidification and/or packaging activities are shown in the lower 
half of Figure 3-1. These activities are applicable to either spent fitel or reprocessed 
high-level waste, since in the case of a throwaway decision only packaging would be 
required. In parallel with NRC's development of solidified waste disposal-performance 
criteria, ERDA can finalize a demonstration program for solidification and packaging of 
high-level waste from light water reactors. This program would result in the design of a 
demonstration waste solidification facility by ERDA. Prior to the granting of a construc­
tion license, NRC must finalize an EIS for this facility. Subsequent to NRC's granting a 
construction license, construction activities can commence. After construction of the 
plant, NRC examines the facility to determine whether or not it warrants an operating 
license. If this license is granted, the demonstration waste solidification facility for high­
level waste from light water reactors could produce waste packages suitable for shipping 
to the high-level waste disposal repository operated by ERDA. 
According to the present federal law(Ref. 47), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
must take possession of the high-level waste at the waste repository as its "owner." This 
regulation appears to put NRC in a conflict-of-interest situation. It appears that ERDA 
should be the "owner" of the waste. This provision may have been a legislative 
oversight. 
B. Interagency Coordination 
In order to operate a repository for commercial high-level nuclear waste by 1985, a 
complex set ofactivities must be undertaken by the Federal government. An Ad Hoc Inter­
agency Task Force on Commercial Nuclear Waste Management was formed in the spring 
of 1976 (Ref. 48) to insure internal compatibility of the Federal government's activities in 
this area. The task force was chaired by OMB and included representatives from CEQ, 
EPA, ERDA, NRC and USGS. This task force was phased out at the end of July 1976 
(Ref. 49) and replaced by the White House Fri Committee (Ref. 50). The Fri Committee 
provided information for President Gerald Ford's Nuclear Policy Statement on Octo­
ber 28, 1976. At present, there is no interagency committee for coordinating the Federal 
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government's efforts in commercial nuclear waste management, although such a group is 
called for in the National Energy Plan (Ref. 51). 
A JPL modification of the OMB interagency task force flow chart showing the 
interconnection of the government's high-level waste management activities is presented 
in Figure 3-2. This chart shows considerably more detail than Figure 3-1, which focused 
principally on regulatory activities. The major milestone activities are highlighted with 
ellipses at the top of the chart. These major activities include providing a better definition 
of high-level waste; determining regulations for interim storage; preparing environmental 
standards for high-level waste disposal; development of general regulations by NRC; 
docketing of the environmental reports and applications, and construction of the 
repository; obtaining an operating license; and finally, receiving the high-level waste at 
the national repository. A similar flow chart should be prepared for spent fuel disposal. 
The sub-activities which must be accomplished in order to lead to each major activity 
are shown below the respective major activities- Alternate sets of sub-activities have been 
shaded in order to make the chart easier to read. The following abbreviations have been 
used in Figure 3-2: 
TAD Technical Alternatives Document
 

DGEIS Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement


EIS Environmental Impact Statement


INT International


ENV Environment


ACRS Advisory -Committee on Reactor Safety


DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement


FEIS Final Environmental Impact Statement


SER Safety Evaluation Report


FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report


FSER Final Safety Evaluation Report.
 

Figure 3-2 shows that the majority of the activities occur during 1977 and 1978. In 
order to ascertain the credibility of the proposed schedule, and also to determine if there 
are major technological or regulatory gaps in the proposed schedule, it is necessary to 
examine the nuclear waste programs of EPA, NRC, and ERDA. A detailed examination 
of the available-material from EPA, NRC, and ERDA is presented in appendixes B, C and 
D. Principal observations of the EPA, ERDA, and NRC programs are discussed in the 
following sections. The overall budgetary perspective shown in Figure 3-3 is quite helpful 
.to have before considering these observations. The three "pie-charts" show the 
distribution of the total funds for the programmatic development of waste management 
technology and regulations in Fiscal Year 1975, 1976 and 1977. The dominance of 
ERDA's budget is clearly shown. This fact should be kept in mind when reading about the 
programs of these three agencies. For FY-75 and.FY-76, the angles shown for EPA have 
been exaggerated to make them visible on the chart. 
C. EPA Program Observations 
The Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for the environmental radiation


protection criteria and standards for nuclear waste management operations. This responsi­

bility is implemented by the Office of Radiation Programs (ORP). An examination of the


statutory authorities, programs, financial and personnel resources of ORP has revealed


several apparent problem areas.
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First, environmental standards for nuclear waste management must be supported by 
thorough data in order to avoid unnecessary delays and costs required by future revisions 
of the standard. For this reason, they must be based on the best available scientific and 
engineering knowledge on the environmental pathways, effects of radiation, and risks to 
the population. The official position of the Office of Radiation Programs is that they are 
satisfied to -leave these" activities in the hands of'NRC and ERDA, and that the existing 
scientific knowledge base is adequate for settling environmental standards. EPA will 
continue to use the results of ionizing radiation research beihg carried out by other 
agencies, most notably the Energy Research and Development Administration and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the findings from approximately $2 billion invested 
in the study of ionizing radiation health effects and control technology over the past 25 
years. EPA is formalizing cooperative research and operational arrangements with these 
agencies to assure that the technological bases for EPA standards are founded on sound 
scientific knowledge. However, no major cooperative research projects have been 
initiated by ERDA or NRC at the specific request of EPA's Office of Radiation Programs 
to this date. 
Controversy exists over issues such as the form of the waste, whether disposal should 
be retrievable or irretrievable, and the determination of what constitutes an acceptable 
long-term hazard. Uncertainties exist regarding geologic stability, mine shaft plugging, 
hydrology and economics. Given the controversy, uncertainty, and complexity that 
characterize the present state of scientific information, the level of effort supported by the 
resources available to ORP appears to have been insufficient. EPA's roles and responsi­
bilities in Nuclear Waste Management have been increasing while its financial and 
manpower resources devoted to these responsibilities substantially declined in recent years 
(see Appendix B). These trends appear to be inconsistent with increased national priorities 
andgoals in radiation waste management. However, a recent increase (Ref. 52) in funding 
of $2.4 inillion, which is equivalent to an increase of 51% of ORP's entire program, will 
help to alleviate this inconsistency. Even with this increase, it appears that EPA-ORP may 
have considerable difficulty in meeting the present time schedules for development of 
environmental standards for high-level waste. 
Second, research, development and monitoring of low level radiation effects, 
environmental transport pathways and mechanisms, and environmental and health impacts 
are required in order to develop, improve.and verify radiation protection standards and 
practices. The authority and"resources available to EPA for environmental ionizing 
radiation research and monitoring need to be strengthened and perhaps merged into a 
comprehensive Environmental Radiation Protection and Monitoring System. 
Third, since various radionuclides present their respective hazards to environmental 
health regardless of their source in the nuclear fuel cycle, standards should attempt to limit 
the total radiation in the environment to an "acceptable level." Since the risks associated 
with this "acceptable level" must be balanced with offsetting benefits, it is difficult to 
understand how such a benefit/cost analysis can be performed to arrive at separate 
standards for different components and features of a complete, nuclear fuel cycle. 
Therefore, there does not appear to be any scientific rationale for promulgating separate 
standards for the uranium fuel cycle, high-level waste, low-level waste, and plutonium 
recycle. This approach may be based on expediency because of insufficient resources. 
D. ERDA Program Observations 
The basic-goal of ERDA's waste management and reprocessing programs is to provide 
safe, efficient, and timely handling and processing of spent nuclear fuel and fuel cycle 
waste. To achieve this goal, numerous programs and projects have been developed by 
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Figure 3-3. Federal Government High-Level Waste Management Program Support (FY 1975 - FY 1977)
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ERDA. The specific objectives of a program or project are dependent on the current 
technological and political concern with the subject matter. A gross indication of the 
interest in a subject can be obtained by examining funding trends. 
ERDA Program funding for waste management and reprocessing has increasedA 00% 
in FY-77 and is expected to increase by another 70% in FY-78. Significant funding 
increases occurred between FY-76/77 and FY-77/78 in the areas of waste management­
commercial (600%, 78%), long-term waste management-ERDA (80%, 60%), nuclear 
fuel cycle supporting operations (over 100%/yr), and management of surplus contami­
nated facilities (0%, 97%). These increases should be compared with corresponding 
increases of 35% and 30% in the total ERDA budget. With the information available from 
ERDA, an analysis of the budgetary trends in combination with the program, project, and 
task descriptions indicated three significant areas that ERDA is not presently addressing. 
(1) 	 Until recently, there was essentially no program for disposing of unreprocessed 
spent fuel rods. We believe that this constituted a major gap in the ERDA pro­
gram. ERDA is presently in the process of planning a relatively small program 
for this area (Ref. 53). In response to President Carter's statement calling for the 
indefinite deferral of reprocessing, there appears to be an urgent need for a con­
siderable expansion in this program (Ref. 54). The specific aspects of this opera­
tion that are of growing concern are the long-term storage, packaging, and final 
disposition of the spent fuel. 
(2) 	 ERDA does not appear to be investigating the waste management implications of 
going ahead with reprocessing and recycling U only. Waste management opera­
tions would be affected by the inclusion of plutonium in the waste stream; also 
the potential hazard and the project pathways to man would be affected. 
(3) 	 Present plans for the immobilization of solidified high-level waste call for incor­
porating approximately 28% by weight of high-level waste in a glass (Ref. 55). 
A Battelle study reports information that confirms that large stresses do exist in 
some glasses with simulated HLW. "The RLG samples shattered into many 
pieces, none over 0.75 in. in their longest dimension, during core-drilling." The 
major criteria that lead to this percentage include leachability and reduction of 
packaging cost. Incorporation of this high percentage of high-level waste into a 
glassy cylinder a foot in diameter and ten feet long leads to centerline tempera­
tures in excess of 650°C for one-year-old waste (Ref. 56). These high tempera­
tures coupled with the thermal design of the package determine the center-to­
center spacing of the cylinders in, for example, a proposed bedded salt 
repository (Ref. 57). During this study, several questions have arisen concerning 
the desirability of this high percentage of radioactive waste in the glass. Has a 
study been performed to determine the influence of HLW percentage in the glass 
on the net cost of the complete HLW disposal system? Lower HLW percentages 
in the glass would, for example, be accompanied by a decrease in radiation 
shielding weight for the shipping containers, and by decreased HLW cylinder 
centerline temperatures. Even though the number of containment holes to be 
drilled in the repository would be increased, the decrease in heat flux per cylinder 
would permit the waste cylinders to be packed in a denser array, with a possible 
reduction in the area of repository. A drawback to decreasing the percentage of 
HLW in the glass is the potential increase in radiation dose to operating 
personnel. 
Has adequate information been obtained concerning the possibility of the incor­
poration of permanent stress in the glass caused by the time dependent tempera­
ture distribution within the glass? These permanent stresses could be similar to 
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those deliberately created in tempered glass to increase its strength. Tempered 
glass, however, has several drawbacks that accompany its increased strength. If 
a "seed" of unmelted glass feedstock is incorporated in the glass, the dif­
ference in expansion coefficient between the seed and the glass can cause the 
glass to spontaneously shatter years after its fabrication. This shattenng can also 
occur if an unstable permanent stress distribution is created. If this shattering 
were to occur within the glass, the effective surface area of the glass would be 
increased by a factor of 100. Hence, geospheric transport calculations based on 
water leaching the surface area of a right circular cylinder could be in error by 
two orders of magnitude. It would be highly desirable to determine the 
permanent stress distribution inside the HLW glass as a function of time in order 
to assure that this type of shattering of the glass could not possibly occur. 
E. 	 NRC Program Observations 
During the latter part of our study (March, 1977), organizational changes and 
significant budget and personnel revisions were initiated in the NRC waste management 
program. For example, the FY-1977 budget has been internally reallocated to provide for 
an Assistant Division Director for Waste Management with a 200% increase in contract 
money and a 240% increase in personnel positions. The increased emphasis is planned to 
continue in FY-1978. 
It appears that most of NRC's-research support, as shown by their contracts, comes 
from ERDA Laboratories (Ref. 58). This does not necessarily have an adverse affect on 
the operation of NRC; however, it may reduce public confidence in NRC's regulatory 
independence. NRC is trying to develop a more independent confirmatory research 
capability in the area of waste management, but has indicated that this process will take 
time. 
One of NRC's first activities in the area of nuclear waste management program 
planning and development was the organization of a task force to examine the goals of 
waste management. In its draft reports (Ref. 59), the task force set forth three guiding 
principles for NRC's licensing functions: 
(1) 	 The burden of proof that the goals of a waste management system are met must 
rest with the proponents of the technology, and not with the opponents. 
(2) 	 Reversibility in the selection and implementation of waste management options 
is a virtue, and irreversibility is a flaw. 
(3) 	 Full and effective public participation must be provided at all stages of the 
decision-making and implementation process. 
If by "reversibility" the task force means reversibility over the next few decades, we 
agree with this principle. However, we believe that the waste' should not be indefinitely 
maintained in a retrievable form because of potential hazards and expenses to future 
generations. If these recommended guiding principles are adopted by NRC and reflected in 
NRC's operation decisions, it would tend to increase public confidence in the Federal 
program. 
In later sections, the regulatory disparities between military and commercial 
high-level nuclear waste are discussed. Since the regulatory procedures for HLW 
repositories are intended to insure the health and safety of present and future generations, 
it is difficult to understand the basis for following different regulatory procedures for 
21

defense and commercial HLW. We recommend that NRC have very strong and equal 
regulatory controls over both defense high-level waste and commercial high-level waste. 
F. HLW Program Management Observations 
As this section of the report has demonstrated, the national -effort for disposal of 
high-level nuclear wastes is characterized by a complex set of institutional interactions. 
The principal governmental agencies involved in HLW management, i.e., EPA, ERDA, 
and NRC, must interact not only with each other, but also with other parts of the Federal 
government such as CEQ, USGS, OMB, OSTP, etc. In addition, interactions must take 
place between various governmental agencies, industry, state and local governments, and 
last but not least, the public. 
The size of the HLW program for FY-78 has grown to approximately $200 million 
per year. This large budget is but one indicator of the importance to the society of 
successful management of high-level nuclear waste. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for disposal of 
commercial high-level waste, provide a somewhat simplified view of the interagency 
activities, involved in commercial high-level nuclear waste management. Considerably 
more detail concerning these activities is provided in Volume II, Appendixes B, C, and D, 
for EPA, ERDA, and NRC, respectively. As these diagrams, and the more detailed 
backup material in Volume 11 of this report indicate, the interactions between various 
agencies, industry, governments and public are quite complex. A highly schematic 
representation of the principal interactions is shown in Figure 3-4. 
How can such a complex program be given more overall coherence? One possible 
way might be to have a central focal point for the program, that is, to "put somebody in 
charge." It is quite clear that an industrial group such as the Office of Waste Isolation 
cannot credibly be in charge of such a program, since OWI works directly for ERDA, and 
hence could not be held accountable for the activities of other governmental agencies. 
Similarly, ERDA itself cannot be in charge of this overall enterprise, since it cannot exert 
control over the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commis­
sion without violating their independence. If either the Environmental Protection Agency 
or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were to be "put in charge" of this enterprise, it is 
difficult to understand how they could be perceived as maintaining their objectivity in 
regulating health and safety aspects, while simultaneously being engaged in "promo­
tional" activities in the management of the overall program. 
One possible option for providing more coherence to this program might be the 
formation of some interagency working group, such as the short-lived Ad Hoc Interagency 
Task Force on Commercial Nuclear Waste Management. In order for such a group to be 
effective, a clear designation of its authorities and responsibilities would be required. In 
addition, "its "half-life" would have to be considerably longer than that of the previous 
interagency committee. Another possible approach to improve the HLW management 
program might be to appoint a single individual from, for example, the Executive Office 
of the President, to serve as a focal point for the nation's high-level nuclear waste 
management program. If either of these approaches were adopted, special care would 
have to be exerted to insure that the "independence" of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission was not compromised in any way, either real or perceived, by this approach. 
These approaches to improvement of high-level nuclear waste management program 
coherence are not as sweeping as those recommended by Willrich (Ref. 60). He concludes 
that "the existing organization for radioactive waste management will be unworkable if 
left unchanged." To remedy this situation, he recommends that "a national Radioactive 
Waste Authority should be established as a federally chartered public corporation . . [to] 
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manage all HL and TRU wastes under U.S. jurisdiction." This approach is quite 
interesting; however, its adoption could be accompanied by organizational transients that 
would at least initially delay the program. Whether or not the initial delays associated with 
this plan would be adequately compensated for by subsequent significant improvements 
does not appear to be clear. 
The options involving either a coordinating group or a single individual as a program 
coordinator and decision-making focal point appear much simpler to implement with 
minimal organization transients. Such arrangements would help to eliminate program 
inconsistencies, such as the conducting of repository site selection activities by ERDA 
before the promulgation of siting criteria by NRC. It could also be quite useful in more 
quickly removing uncertainties concerning requirements for site review and construction 
licenses for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste. The reduction of inconsistencies and 
uncertainties would tend to increase the public acceptability of this program. 
Another action that would remove some of the uncertainty regarding high-level waste 
would be a better definition of the term high-level waste. A need for improved definitions 
of high-level waste has been pointed out by both the Environmental Protection Agency 
(Volume II, page B-25) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Volume II, page D-18). 
It appears desirable that the redefinition include consideration of parameters such as the 
quantity of specific radionuclides, concentrations, and toxicity, and not simply be oriented 
toward the source of the radionuclides. Hopefully, definitions can be developed in such a 
manner that the disposal requirements for a given quantity of actinides are independent of 
whether they are contained in high-level waste or in low-level waste. 
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Section IV 
Institutional Interactions 
Having considered the range of strategic decisions available in selecting commercial 
nuclear fuel recycle options in Section II, and the former U.S. "mainline" program for 
disposal of commercial high-level nuclear waste, in Section III, we are now in a position 
to examine some of the principal institutional interactions affecting nuclear waste manage­
ment. The importance of effective institutional interactions in the successful development 
of both commercial and military high-level waste repositories has been emphasized by 
Willrich (Ref. 61). Important factors to be considered in examining these interactions 
include: 
* 	 The distribution of regulatory responsibilities among federal, state and municipal 
organizations. 
" 	 State and local actions. 
* 	 Transportation issues. 
* 	 Timing of programmatic activities 
These factors are discussed in the following sections. 
A. Regulatory Responsibilities 
A 	 summary of the institutions responsible for performing specific regulatory func­
tions for various high-level waste management processes is shown in Figure 4-1. The 
regulatory functions shown are: environmental guidance and standards, siting approval, 
construction licensing, operations licensing, and monitoring and enforcement. The waste 
management processes shown include: temporary storage, treatment, packaging, transpor­
tation, retrievable storage, and permanent disposition. This chart is based primarily on 
Willrich's legislative analysis (Ref. 62). 
B. Some Regulatory Uncertainties 
For the areas of both retrievable storage and permanent disposition of HLW, Fig­
ure 4-2 points out that NRC has not decided its position on the requirements for the 
following regulatory steps: 
(1)Commercial Siting Review for retrievable storage. 
(2) Commercial Siting Review for permanent disposition. 
(3) Military Siting Review for retrievable storage. 
(4) Military Siting Review for permanent disposition. 
(5) Commercial Construction Licensing for retrievable storage. 
(6) Commercial Construction Licensing for permanent storage. 
(7) Military Construction Licensing for retrievable storage. 
(8) Military Construction Licensing for permanent disposition. 
Even though NRC has not decided on these matters, our entries shown in Figure 4-1 are 
based on ERDA's plans (Ref. 64) in the case of military waste, and on the assumption of a 
strong regulatory position in the case of commercial waste. In the case of nuclear reactors, 
there is a precedent for site review, since an optional early site review can be requested by 
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an electrical utility. A clarification of these matters by NRC would remove one component 
of uncertainty from the U.S. high-level waste management program. 
If NRC is "excluded" from both site selection review and the granting of construc­
tion licensing, it would not be able to make important independent formal judgments of 
the adequacy of the repository until the application for an operating license was filed. If, 
at that time, NRC found the site to be inadequate, the entire process of site selection and 
construction would have to be repeated for a new site. This type of potential delay could 
be avoided if NRC exercised regulatory authority over both siting and construction. The 
additional efforts that these requirements would impose on ERDA do not appear to be 
excessive, since ERDA personnel (Ref. 65) have indicated that they plan to informally 
submit the same information to NRC that would be submitted if formal site review and 
construction licensing were required. In addition, this type of strong regulatory control by 
NRC could help to improve public perception of the national high-level waste manage­
ment program. Hence, we conclude that NRC should have regulatory control over siting 
and construction of high-level waste repositories for both commercial and military waste. 
1. Operations Licenses for Military HLW Management 
Referring back to operations licensing entries shown inFigure 4-2, it is interesting to 
note that ERDA is regulatingitselfin the areasof temporarystorage treatment. According 
to Willrich, ". . . this type of ERDA self-regulation is specifically authorized by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This approach may be justifiable on national security grounds 
in part." 
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides NRC the authority to license only 
certain ERDA facilities: 
Retrievable surface storage facilities and other facilities authorized for the 
express purpose of subsequent long-ter'n storage of high-level radioactivewaste 
generatedby the Administration, which are not used-for or are part of, research and 
development activities." (Emphasis by authors) -
Hence, NRC clearly must license the operation of retrievable storage and permanent 
disposition facilities for military high-level waste as is shown in Figure 4-1. 
2. Military HLW Experimental Program 
Under current regulations the Energy Research and Development Administration is 
permitted to conduct experimental tests of military high-level waste without obtaining an 
NRC operating license. In the case of the commercial high-level waste, ERDA is required 
to obtain an NRC license in order to conduct repository tests. This represents a different 
regulatory treatment for the military and commercial high-level nuclear waste. This 
difference can be justified in several ways. 
If the site for these experiments is not intended to be the site for ultimate disposal of 
the high-level waste, it appears reasonable that some samples could be tested at the site for 
some period of time and then removed. In the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) program 
such tests are planned. An important question could be raised-'"How many cylinders 
constitute an experimental test? Is the number 1, 10, 100, or possibly 1,000?" The Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) program appears to consider that the deposition of hundreds 
of cylinders is an experimental rather than production activity (Ref 66). As a rough point 
of comparison, 10 cylinders of solidified high-level waste represent the HLW output of a 
1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor for one year. Hence, the number of cylinders involved in 
the WIPP experiment would represent a substantial fraction of the HLW from U.S. 
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electrical power nuclear reactors. Testing such a large number of high-level waste 
cylinders could be perceived as a violation of the conditions under which no license is 
required. This could lead to suits by intervenors which could cause serious delays in the 
WIPP program. One way to avoid these potentialproblems would beforERDA to applyfor an NRC license for the WIPP high-level waste demonstration. The possibility of 
licensing the WIPP facility has been mentioned ira WIPP report previously (Ref. 67). 
This approach could restrict some of the flexibility in the ERDA program, and could lead 
to some delays because of the necessary paperwork; however it would also tend to 
increase the public acceptability, of these tests. 
Having considered the general framework for high-level waste regulatory responsi­
bilities, and some of the current regulatory issues, it is appropriate to examine the impact 
of current state and local actions on these matters. 
C. State and Local Actions 
The publicly acceptable resolution of the issues involving fuel reprocessing and 
waste disposal involves institutional interactions among federal and state governments, 
industry (both nuclear vendors and utilities), and the public. Under the 1954 Atomic 
Energy Act, the federal government has preempted the states from certain decisions in the 
nuclear fuel cycle. Section 274 of the 1959 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act appears 
to further strengthen the federal preemptory powers. The Supreme Court has upheld the 
rights of federal preemption in the Minnesota (Ref. 68) case, denying the right of a state to 
set environmental standards for a nuclear power plant that are more stringent than the 
standards set by the federal government. It is interesting to note that, by contrast, the 
states are free to set standards that are more strict than federal standards for fossil fuel 
power plants. Recent initiatives in states such as California on issues of waste disposal and 
reprocessing (Ref. 69) cause the political viability of preemption to be a cloudy issue. 
Furthermore, the recent letter from ERDA ex-administrator Seamans to the governor of 
Michigan (Ref. 70) appears to have granted the states a veto over whether or not the 
federal government will be allowed to put a high-level waste disposal site in a given state. 
State and local governments are becoming increasingly active in nuclear fuel cycle 
issues. Initiatives to delay or stop the growth of nuclear power have been voted upon in 
California, Colorado, Arizona, Ohio, Oregon, Washington and Montana (Refs. 71-74). 
Although these initiatives have been defeated, they indicate that a substantial portion of 
the population is concerned about issues involving nuclear safety, reprocessing and waste 
management. In general, the lack of agreement among scientists and engineers (as 
evidenced, for example, by the ERCDC hearing testimony), (Refs. 75-78), concerning the 
adequacy of our scientific data base for high-level waste disposal decisions, is shared by 
large segments of the public. Public confidence in governmental plans and actions in the 
high-level waste disposal area is crucial to the successful development of an ultimate 
repository for high-level waste disposal. 
D. Site Selection/Criteria Timing 
The national plan for developing a permanent repository for commercial high-level 
waste is designed, in part, to engender public confidence in the nation's ability to properly 
dispose of this waste. As a part of this effort, ERDA is planning to select two nuclear 
high-level waste repository sites by 1978 (Refs. 79, 80). NRC is planning to propose 
repository suitability criteria by January 1978 and finalize the criteria by September 1978 
(Ref. 81). According to R. Cunningham of NRC (Ref. 82)," . . .this is a very difficult 
schedule to meet ... but we think we can do it .... A big unknown is how long the 
public hearing procedures go on .... That's something we can't control." 
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A summary of the response of Dr. Taylor, Science Advisor to the Governor of 
Michigan, to the above plan follows (Ref. 83). 
"The-problem outlined by Dr. Kuhlman specifies the location of the first two repost­
tones by 1978. And that is the program that's been given to us in Michigan,the pro­
gram that we feel we're operating under. Yet, the technology for reprocessiig, for 
solidification, and even for the design of the repository, is not scheduled to be com­
pleted by 1978. We've heard from Dr. Cunningham today that the criteria for sites 
would not be out until 1979, perhaps 1980. The design of the repository is scheduled 
for completion in 1982. This means that the states that are being considered are really 
being asked to agree to the selection of a site in their state on the promise that the 
activities can be operated safely. 
Now, even if you can convince the state government officials-the Governor, the 
Legislature, and Energy Commission-that the risks are small and that the problems 
will be solved before nuclear waste is finally reposited in 1985 or, as Mr. Shealy 
(Ref. 84) recommended, that we can convincea group of state officials that the prob­
lems can be solved, I don't think we're going to convince the people that the problems 
are going to be solved in 1978 when the site has to be selected." 
It appears that the order of activities for the selection of.sites and the development of site 
selection criteria should be reconsidered, in order to avoid needless difficulties with the 
states. This may require a change in the 1985 deadline for an operational High-Level 
Waste Repository. Since this schedule needs to be reexamined in light of President 
Carter's decision to-indefinitely defer reprocessing, this may be an opportune time to make 
such adjustments to avoid needless irritation of state and local governments. 
E. Transportation Issues 
Several transportation issues pose problems for themanagement of high-level nuclear 
waste. The issues include: 
(1) State and local government attempts to restrict or prohibit shipment. 
(2) Railroads requiring special trains with speed and other operating restrictions. 
Commercial spent fuel rods and research fuel rods have been transported to both the 
NFS facility in West Valley, New York and the GE facility at Morris, Illinois. Licensing 
of transportation systems and shielding casks is jointly conducted by the NRC and the 
Department of Transportation (DOT). A memorandum of Understanding between the 
Department of Transportation and the Atomic Energy Commission was published in the 
Federal Register in April of 1973 in order to define the division of regulatory authority 
between these agencies. Required specific standards and criteria (Refs. 85, 86) are based 
upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criteria published in 1967. 
Increased concern over the safety of such shipments has been expressed by state and 
local governments, by railroads, and by organized intervenor groups. Some state and local 
governments have attempted to restrict or prohibit the shipment of radioactive materials 
through their regions (Refs. 87, 88). ERDA has challenged these actions on the basis of 
federal preemption of the regulations of such shipments. Lack of resolution of these cases 
adds uncertainty to both the cost of existing facilities, and the siting of future nuclear 
facilities. The American Asociation of Railroads believes that special trains are required 
for shipping of nuclear materials. These trains must stop when other trains pass by, and 
are limited to speeds of 35 miles per hour. If a train were to carry spent fuel rods, it would 
not be permitted to carry any other freight or passengers. The proposed tariff charges that 
the railroads have filed before the Interstate Commerce Commission have been protested 
by ERDA and the nuclear industry. ERDA and the nuclear industry have challenged the 
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railroads' positiom that they are common carriers of nuclear materials. The ICC has 
allowed the proposed tariff charges to go into effect pending a final decision on their 
propriety. "Under this new tariff, all railshipments of nuclear spent fuel and waste must 
be moved only in special trains, at an additional cost of about 20 dollars per mild; or about 
30,000 dollars each for an average 1,500 mile one-way trip. This increment of 30,000 
dollars-is-to-be compared-with-the-regular freightcharge df-about 9,000 dollars for such a 
shipment (Ref. 89). 
In contrast, the trucking industry appears to be enthusiastic about shipping nuclear 
materials. However, extensive use of trucks could lead to increased costs of unloading the 
spent fuel rods from the reactor spent fuel pools, since the truck spent fuel shipping casks 
are somewhat smallerthan those for trains. In addition, the increased number of shipments 
could~have an adverse impacton the-public acceptability of these shipments. According to 
the ERC Nuclear Sub-Committee staff (Ref. 90): "If ,a combination of economic and 
regulatory constraints make all present transportation modes, infeasible or unacceptable, 
the possibility of Federal control of all shipping may have to be considered. Concern over 
theft or diversion of fissile materials~has already led to-discussion of this possibility, and 
the Federal government has recently taken over all shipments of nuclear materials in the 
Department of Defense programs." 
The throwaway option has a transportation advantage if the fuel rod packaging 
facility is collocated with the high-level waste repository, since this approach would 
eliminate shipment from a reprocessing plant to the repository. The same considerations 
apply to collocation of the fuel reprocessing plant (FRP) and the repository; however, 
collocation of high-level waste repositories at current FRP sites may not be geologically 
desirable. According to the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Waste Disposal 
(Ref. 91): "No existing AEC installation which generates either high-level or inter­
mediate-level waste appears to have a satisfactory geological location for the safe disposal, 
of such waste products." However, a later Academy report (Ref. 92) concludes that 
" . . . there is a reasonable prospect of achieving such protection (for not less than 1,000 
years).in vaults in rocks underlying the Tuscaloosa Formation beneath the Savannah River 
Plant site. This conclusion refers only to wastes that have been aged a minimum of 10 
years. 
In view of these different views at the National Academy of Science perhaps new 
"power parks" could be built at locations with suitable geologic structure (Ref. 93). "If 
transportation of nuclear materials becomes uneconomic due to physical or regulatory 
difficulties, a.greater incentive will apply to investigate integrated nuclear energy centers 
in -which fuel conversion, enrichment and fabrication as well as reprocessing and waste 
disposal might be provided for a complex of reactors providing from 10 to 20 GWe. The 
difficulties in implementing the construction and operation of such-centers should not be 
minimized." 
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Section V Pc2OR 
Findings and Observations 
In the preceding sections of this report, we have examined the most pressing issues 
affecting Federal high-level nuclear waste management programs. Particular emphasis has 
been placed on identifying the problems of interagency coordination; Federal, State, and 
private sector decisions required; compatibility (or its absence) between these elements in 
a logical time sequence, and gaps in present programs. Our principal findings and 
observations are outlined in this Section. 
A. Disposition of Spent Fuel Rods 
A Presidential decision to indefinitely defer the reprocessing of commercial spent 
fuel rods has been made. This decision has important implications for waste management. 
At present, spent fuel rods are accumulating in spent fuel pools at reactor sites that are 
widely distributed across the country. Over one million fuel rods per year would be 
discharged from a system of reactors producing 100 GW(e), so the problem of their 
long-term storage is far from trivial. The accumulation of spent fuel rods at reactor sites 
should be limited, since a continuation of present practices into the indefinite future would 
constitute a de facto form of nuclear waste disposal. Concentration of spent fuel rods in a 
few regional spent fuel pools may become economically attractive, but it does nothing to 
reassure the general public that the U.S. is capable of solving the problem of permanent 
disposal. However, if unforeseen significant delays should arise in the program to 
develop an operational repository by 1985, there is some risk of deterioration of fuel rod 
cladding in the water basin, and subsequent leakage of radioactive material. For this 
reason, it may be necessary to provide interim dry, passive, retrievable storage in either 
surface or sub-surface facilities, until acceptable permanent repositories are available. 
B. Throwaway/Stowaway and Reprocessing/Recycling 
Even if the spent fuel rods are transferred to centralized, Federal spent fuel pools they 
cannot be kept there indefinitely. If the "throwaway option" is selected, the lifetime of 
the LWR as an energy source would be limited to about 50 years by U.S. uranium 
reserves. Furthermore, the opportunity for developing the plutonium fast breeder reactor 
in the U.S. at some future date would be lost. On the positive side, the "throwaway 
oafton" insures that the plutonium and other radioactive substances such as 8Kr, 3 H, and 
I C in the spent fuel rods are not separated from the fission products, thus minimizing the 
problems of environmental gaseous controls, safeguards and proliferation. Also, ship­
ments of radioactive materials are minimized, especially if the spent fuel assembly 
packaging plant and the disposal site are collocated. 
The "stowaway option" provides the flexibility that may be required under present 
and continuing uncertainties. This option involves retrievable storage and safe contain­
ment of the spent fuel rods in well-guarded surface or sub-surface Federal facilities for a 
period of a few decades. In another form of this option, the utilities could store the spent 
fuel in the hope that the net economic value of the fissile materials would exceed their 
costs for storage, transportation, and reprocessing. During this storage period, R&D 
(including demonstration) on permanent high-level waste disposal and alternative nuclear 
fuel cycle options could be vigorously pursued in an orderly manner. Regardless of the 
final decision on disposal of spent fuel rods, stowaway for a period of, for example, 20 
years, has the advantage of reducing both the radioactivity and the rate of thermal energy 
output by a factor of 20, compared to respective values one year after discharge. On the 
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other hand, the stowaway option has several drawbacks compared with the throwaway 
option. These include increased costs of maintenance and safeguards, increased land use, 
and the possibility of increased exposure of the population to radioactivity. 
Whether or not a satisfactory system of international controls and safeguards for 
'commercial' reprocessing and recy6ling of plutonium and uranium is developed, the 
adoption of the "stowaway option" would allow the U.S. to be in the position of being 
able to use the fissile material in spent fuel at some future date, if it so desires. 
C. 	 Commercial Fuel Reprocessing 
.By reprocessing spent fuel and recycling the recoverable plutonium and uranium, the 
amount of fresh uranium (U30.) required to generate a given amount of electrical energy 
can be reduced by 30% to 40% as compared with the open-cycle LWR. In addition, after 
about 1,000 years, the radioactivity of reprocessed fuel waste is reduced by a factor of 
about 10 compared with throwaway waste from a LWR fuel cycle. Many other LWR fuel 
cycle options are available, all of which affect the character of the final "waste." 
Decision paths showing these options are discussed in Section II. 
Even.if reprocessing and recycling should become politically acceptable at some later 
date, the future of commercial fuel reprocessing in the U.S. will continue to be surrounded 
by uncertainties, and hence, economic risk. Some regulatory uncertainties arise out of 
current NRC hearings and regulations on the health, safety and environmental aspects of 
plutonium recycling. Other uncertainties involve the economic desirability of reprocess­
ing. On the other hand, no significant technological uncertainties are expected to arise in 
meeting the new EPA standards for population exposure (25 m rem/year), and for 
discharge of SKr, 129I and actinides from fuel reprocessing plants. 
In addition to Federal legal and regulatory actions, the States are taking an increasing 
interest in all aspects of reprocessing, as exemplified by the extensive hearings being 
conducted in 1977 by the State of California. 
These hearings have brought out important information concerning the technological 
and capital investment problems of commercial reprocessing, and the highly probable 
requirement for Federal financing in the early stages. 
D. 	 Commercial High-Level Waste Disposal 
Since large quantities of high-level nuclear waste from both the military weapons 
program and the commercial nuclear power industry are extant and growing, there is no 
way to avoid making decisions that could potentially affect the lives of the next 30 to 
30,000 generations. A nuclear waste management plan has been formulated by the 
Federal government culminating in the operation of a national repository for high-level 
nuclear waste in a retrievable mode by 1985. This plan has two major components: (1) 
activities leading to the development of a repository, including site selection, construc­
tion, operations, monitoring and enforcement; (2) activities leading to solidification 
and/or packaging of high-level waste. A thorough-review of the programs of EPA, ERDA 
and NRC (Section III) led us to the following observations and conclusions: 
(1) 	 Recent experience with Federal court challenges by intervenors, as well as the 
spirit and language of the energy reorganization act, leads to the conclusion that 
strict regulatory control over HLW activities is essential to gain public accep­
tance and avoid costly delays in the NWM program. Under Licensing Condi­
tions such as those in IOCFR50, ERDA would be required to obtain both an NRC 
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construction permit, and an NRC operating license It sedms highly desirable 
that NRC adopt this type of dual licensing requirements for commercial high­
level waste repositories. In addition, it appears desirable to require an NRC 
disposal site review­
(2) 	 The NWM program for commercial high-level nuclear waste involves a complex 
set of interactions among the various Federal agencies requiring closer coordina­
tion. The establishment of an interagency committee for coordinating all of the 
Federal government's efforts in commercial NWM is one way of eliminating 
this gap. Another approach might be to appoint a single individual from, for 
example, the Executive Office of the President to serve as a focal point for the 
nation's high-level nuclear waste management program. 
(3) 	 Given the controversy, uncertainty and complexity that characterize the present 
state of scientific information required for setting environmental radiation protec­
tion criteria and standards for nuclear waste management operations, the 
resources available to the Office of Radiation Programs (ORP) of EPA appear 
to have been insufficient. A recent 51% increase in funding, $2.4 million, will 
be of assistance to the EPA program. Even with this increase EPA-ORP may 
have considerable difficulty in meeting the present tight time schedule for devel­
opment of environmental standards for HLW. 
(4) 	 An analysis of the ERDA program indicated three significant areas that the 
agency has not been adequately addressing: 
(a) 	 Disposition of unreprocessed spent fuel rods, especially the long-term 
storage, packaging and final disposition of the spent fuel. 
(b) 	 Waste management implications of a decision to proceed with U-recycling 
only, especially with regard to the inclusion of large amounts of plutonium 
in the waste stream, and the potential hazards and projected pathways to 
man. 
(c) 	 Influence of the weight percentage of HLW in glass on the long-term 
stability of the glass. 
(5) 	 It appears that most of NRC's research support, as shown by its contracts, 
comes from ERDA Laboratories (Ref. 94). This does not necessarily have an 
adverse effect on the operation of NRC; however, it may tend to reduce public 
confidence in NRC's regulatory independence. NRC is trying to develop a more 
independent confirmatory research capability in the area of waste management 
but has indicated that this process will take time. 
(6) 	 In its draft reports (Ref. 95), the NRC nuclear waste management task force set 
forth three guiding principles for NRC's licensing functions: 
(a) 	 The burden of proof that the goals of a waste management system are met 
must rest with the proponents of the technology, and not with the 
opponents. 
(b) 	 Reversibility in the selection and implementation of waste management 
options is a virtue, and irreversibility is a flaw. 
(c) 	 Full and effective public participation must be provided at all stages of the 
decision-making and implementation process. 
These principles appear sound if by "reversibility" the task force means reversi­
bility for the next few decades but not for the long term. 
35

(7) 	 Given the controversy, uncertainty and complexity that characterize the present 
state of scientific information required for setting environmental radiation pro­
tection criteria and standards for nuclear waste management operations, the 
resources available to NRC for Nuclear Waste Management appear to have been 
insufficient. A recent increase in funding of $3.6 million, which amounts to a 
1-50% increase, -will be very helpful' Even with this increase NRC maY have 
considerable difficulty in meeting the present fight time schedules. 
E. Institutional Interactions 
Effective institutional interactions are essential for the successful development of 
both the military and commercial high-level nuclear waste management programs. Our 
analysis of these interactions in Section IV led to the following observations and 
conclusions: 
(1) 	 NRC has not yet decided on its position on regulatory requirements for both 
retrievable storage of, and permanent disposition of high-level wastes in these 
areas: (a) commercial and military disposal siting review; (b) commercial and 
military disposal site construction licensing. 
If NRC is "excluded" from site selection review, and granting a construction 
license, it would not be able to make important, independent formal judgements 
of the adequacy of the repository until the application for an operating license 
was filed. If at this time, NRC found the site to be inadequate, the entire process 
of site selection and construction would have to be repeated for a nev site. 
This type of potential delay could be avoided if NRC had regulatory authority 
over both siting and construction. The additional efforts that these requirements 
would impose on ERDA do not appear to be excessive, since ERDA personnel 
(Ref. 96), have indicated that they plan to informally submit the same 
information to NRC that would be submitted if formal site review and construc­
tion licensing were required. In addition, we believe that this type of strong regu­
latory control could help to improve public confidence in the national high-level 
waste management program. Hence, we conclude that NRC should have regula­
tory control over both siting for, and construction of high-level waste repositories 
for commercial and military waste. 
(2) 	 Under current regulations, ERDA is required to obtain an NRC license to 
conduct pilot repository tests for commercial high-level waste; however, a similar 
license is not required for military high-level waste. In the proposed military 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) program, tests of hundreds of cylinders con­
taining high-level waste are being planned at a site which is not necessarily 
intended as a permanent disposal site. This disparity in licensing procedures 
could lead to court suits by intervenors that could cause serious delays in the 
WIPP program. 
(3) 	 ERDA is-planning to select two high-level waste repository sites by 1978, and is 
already actively engaged in surveying and drilling operations. Yet, NRC's 
proposed repository site selection suitability criteria will not be finalized until 
late 1978 or early 1979. This timing inconsistency may adversely influence the 
acceptability of this program. It appears that the present schedule of ERDA 
activities for site selection should be reconsidered, even if it means a change in 
the 1985 target date for an operational HLW repository. 
(4) Several important transportation issues pose problems for the NWM program: 
(a) 	 State and local government attempts to restrict or prohibit shipment of high­
level nuclear waste. 
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(b) 	 Requirement by railroads of special trains with speed, other operating 
restrictions, and increased costs. In contrast to the railroads, the trucking 
industry appears to be enthusiastic about shipping nuclear materials. 
However, the extensive use of trucks could lead to increased costs because of 
the large number of smaller casks; also the increased number of shipments 
could have an adverse impact on public acceptability. Concern over theft or 
diversion also affect this area. As a last resort the possibility of Federal 
contrbl of all-shipping of nuclear wastes may have to be considered. 
F. 	 Alternative Fuel Cycles 
Alternative nuclear filel cycles should be thoroughly evaluated with the objective-of 
minimizing the problems of high-level waste disposal, proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
and safeguards against theft or terrorist attacks. This analysis should include not only the 
uranium-fueled CANDU heavy-water reactor and the LWR-CANDU tandem reactor, but 
also the thoriuim-23 U high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR), and the 232Th-233U 
light water breeder reactor (LWBR). 
The LWBR is an attractive alternative to the LWR for at least four main reasons:233 23 
(1) 	 The radioactivity of the recycled U and 235U is about 50-times lower than the 
radioactivity of the recycled plutonium and uranium in the self-generated LWR 
(SGR) (4500 Ciper GW(e)-year vs 225;00 Ci perGW(e)-year), (Ref. 97). 
(2) 	 The difficulty in separating 233U and 23SU acts as a barrier to potential theft or 
- diversion of recycled fuel for the manufcture.of nuclear weapons. 
(3) 	 The amount of long-lived plutonium in the high-level waste for the LWBR cycle 
from reprocessing is less than 4.kg per GW year, and'the amounts of americium 
and curium are about one-tenth of this-figure (Ref. 70). After storage for '1000 
years the radioactivity of this reprocessed waste is about 100 times lower than the 
radioactivity of the spent fuel from an open-cycle LWR, and it is no greater than 
the radioactivity of the thorium and-uranium ores-from which the reactor fuel was 
extracted (Ref. 98). 
(4) -U.S. thorium reserves are about 3 time larger than U.S. uranium reserves. 
G. Concluding Remarks 
In the course of this analysis the nuclear waste management team has learned two 
important lessons: 
(1) The problems of high-level nuclear waste management are so complex and have 
so many ramifications that no one person or group of persons can possibly have 
all the answers. 
(2) 	 Flexibility is essential in any viable nuclear fuel cycle and waste management 
plan. No option should be foreclosed permanently until the implications of this 
foreclosure are thoroughly understood. However, this flexible approach should 
not prevent the development of a viable program for permanefnt disposal of high­
level waste. 
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